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Prior to UK Prime Minister David Cameron’s speech on the country’s relationship with the
EU, Michael Emerson set out several hazards that his strategy was expected to face.
Revisiting these hazards after the speech, he finds them to be mostly confirmed. He argues
that Cameron’s policy is badly defined, politically unmanageable, creates uncertainty for
investment, and implies a difficult and clouded scenario for secession if this were to happen.
The best that can be hoped for in Cameron’s reformist agenda is some fine tuning of EU
competences.
David Cameron duly made his speech on Europe on January 23rd. It was long on populist rhetoric but
short on operational detail. In a previous article, bef ore the speech, I set out several hazards that his
expected strategy was going to f ace. So how did the speech f are?
The f irst hazard was that of  plausibly def ining his objective. “We need to examine whether the balance is
right in so many areas where the European Union has legislated, including on the environment, social affairs
and crime”. This cautious language shows that the government cannot yet say what it wants, with the “so
many areas” not identif ied. Then there is the “Launching a process to return some existing justice and
home affairs powers”. Under the Lisbon Treaty the UK has here the option to choose a block opt-out. But
it seems that the UK wants a zig-zag, to opt out wholesale, and then opt back in f or some pref erred
actions.
The Prime Minister continued with some bogus
arguments. “We need a bigger and more
significant role for national parliaments”. Yes,
but this is an old story, with the Lisbon Treaty
devoting a Protocol to this explicit ly; which
Cameron neglected to mention. Nor did he
advance better ideas. And then, “We cannot
harmonise everything”. Yes of  course, but this
is misleading polemic. The Prime Minister
chose to ignore the important paradigm of
‘mutual recognition’ introduced into the 1992
Single Market programme by Lord Cockf ield.
Finally there was much emphasis on improving
Europe’s competit iveness. Again, yes of
course, except that almost all the major
instruments of  competit iveness are in national
hands unencumbered by the EU: wage levels,
tax burdens, education, plus f or the UK, exchange rate f lexibility. The only major exception is trade policy
where the EU is currently engaged in its most ambitious global liberalisation ef f ort ever. Overall, the
speech does not pass this f irst hazard, and on the last three points mentioned above it is populist
misrepresentation.
A second hazard concerns tactics, and the ‘blackmail’ character of  the Prime Minister ’s threat spelt out in
earlier TV interviews to block a new Treaty to strengthen the eurozone if  he does not get his way. Here
the message seems to have got through that this was poor tactics, to say the least, and so the idea was
dropped. Instead, the speech announces … “My strong preference is to enact these changes for the entire
EU, not just for Britain”. “But if there is no appetite for a new Treaty for all of us, then of course Britain should
be ready to address the changes we need in a negotiation without European partners”. But if  the UK then
switches to seeking additional opt-outs, it is easy to imagine a cascade of  cherry-picking requests by
other member states that would destroy EU policies wholesale: France on state aids, Poland on climate,
etc. Instead of  blackmail, Pandora’s box.
A third hazard concerns the potential economic costs of  creating strategic uncertainty f or the UK’s place
in the European market. By setting a f ive-year t ime delay bef ore a ref erendum, the Prime Minister has
undermined the UK’s appeal as a location f or f ootloose investments. An investment strike and continuing
recession f or f ive more years would be a sure recipe f or a No vote in any ref erendum, whatever the
question.
A f ourth hazard is then about the polit ical manageability of  the process. The Prime Minister has chosen
the highest risk option – of  commitment now to an in-out ref erendum in 2017, af ter a general election in
2015 and a Scottish in-out ref erendum in 2014, on the basis of  a renegotiation process f or which the
objectives have not yet been operationally def ined.
A f if th hazard concerns the nature of  the secession scenario. Here the Prime Minister rejects the
Norwegian or Swiss models because of  the loss of  sovereignty in ceasing to have a say over the EU’s
Single Market rules. But in this case the alternative would seem to mean some degree of  exclusion f rom
the Single Market, which is what he values most in the EU. It is bizarre f or him then to say blithely … “Of
course Britain could make her own way in the world, outside the EU, if we chose to do so”.
A sixth hazard concerns the UK’s place in the world. The Prime Minister heard President Obama’s views
on the subject that the US wanted to see a strong UK in a strong EU, and that the ref erendum was a
polit ically hazardous instrument. Cameron’s speech acknowledges these views with “we have more power
and influence … if we act together”.  The case is again being made to avoid secession.
So why create all these hazards in such a convoluted speech? The answer is well understood –
Cameron’s polit ical assessment is that he must appease the Eurosceptics in his party with a plan f or
renegotiation and a ref erendum.
The only sliver of  hope f or a more constructive outcome would be if  Cameron’s call f or the EU to
engage together in a ref ormist agenda could become the main game rather than the pursuit of  opt-outs.
The UK government’s white paper of  July 2012 init iating the ‘balance of  competences’ review announces
a thoroughly prof essional work plan f or identif ying which EU actions might have been misplaced at the
EU level, or clumsily def ined. This could f acilitate some f ine-tuning of  EU competences and remove some
polit ical irritants, but lit t le more.
Opinion polls say that the prime concerns of  the Brit ish people are the economy, immigration and the
quality of  public services; Europe does not even f igure among the top ten issues. However the UK
economy is already in big trouble, in spite of  the 20 per cent devaluation against the euro, and bef ore the
f ull uncertainties created by his European policy has had time to sink in. The issue theref ore becomes
whether the European policy choice, itself  apparently of  lit t le concern to the population, would impact
seriously on the economic issues of  most concern. At least there is t ime bef ore the planned ref erendum
f or evidence to emerge about the UK’s prime economic interests. Time enough maybe to ensure a sound
democratic choice, notwithstanding all the potentially disastrous hazards that Prime Minister Cameron
has organised.
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